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Abstract
We develop and test a frog-in-the-pan hypothesis that predicts investors are less attentive
to information arriving continuously in small amounts than to information with the same cu-
mulative stock price implications arriving in large amounts at discrete timepoints. Intuitively,
we hypothesize that a series of gradual frequent changes attracts less attention than infrequent
dramatic changes. Consistent with our frog-in-the-pan hypothesis, we find strong evidence
that continuous information induces stronger and more persistent return continuation. Over a
six-month holding period, momentum decreases monotonically from 8.86% for stocks with con-
tinuous information during their formation period to 2.91% for stocks with discrete information.
Higher media coverage and higher analyst coverage are associated with more discrete and more
continuous information, respectively.
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1 Introduction
Limited cognitive resources can prevent investors from immediately processing all available infor-
mation. Sims (2003), Peng and Xiong (2006), as well as DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) provide
theoretical foundations that allow limited attention to influence asset prices. Motivated by the
notion that a series of gradual changes attracts less attention than a sudden dramatic change, we
develop and test a frog-in-the-pan hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that investors are less at-
tentive to information arriving continuously in small amounts than to information with the same
cumulative stock price implications arriving in large amounts at discrete timepoints.
According to the frog-in-the-pan anecdote, a frog will jump out of a pan containing boiling
water since the dramatic temperature change induces an immediate reaction. In contrast, if the
water in the pan is slowly raised to a boil, the frog will underreact and perish. In the psychology
literature, Gino and Bazerman (2009) demonstrate that a series of small gradual changes induce
less critical evaluation than large sudden changes. The cost of processing information, as in Merton
(1987), also justifies the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis. For example, the cost of carefully reading an
email is higher than the cost of reading its less informative subject header. Provided the amount
of information in an email can be ascertained from its header, emails containing small amounts of
information receive less attention even if they arrive frequently and are important in aggregate.
The existing literature on limited attention implicitly assumes the existence of an upper at-
tention threshold that constrains the maximum amount of information on all firms that investors
can process in a single period. For example, Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) find greater post-
earnings announcement drift following days with a large number of earnings announcements. They
conclude that investors are overwhelmed by the large amounts of information released on these
days. In contrast, we posit the existence of a lower attention threshold for firm-specific informa-
tion. Specifically, by failing to attract investor attention, the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis predicts
an underreaction to information with important cumulative stock price implications that arrives
continuously in small amounts.
To test our frog-in-the-pan hypothesis, we introduce a measure of information discreteness
that describes the flow of information during a momentum strategy’s formation-period. We then
examine the impact of information discreteness on the holding-period returns of price momentum
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and earnings momentum strategies. With the exception of Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008), the role
of limited attention in explaining momentum has not been explored. Limited attention offers a
middle ground between rational and behavioral explanations for momentum whose large respective
literatures include Johnson (2002) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998). However,
unlike the behavioral theories of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999) that are designed to explain short-term return
continuation as well as long-term return reversal, underreactions induced by limited attention will
not lead to long-term return reversals.
Our first measure of information discreteness is derived from signed daily returns during the
formation period.1 Specifically, information discreteness identifies time series variation in the daily
returns that culminate in equivalent formation-period returns. Intuitively, a high percentage of
positive daily returns relative to negative daily returns implies that a high formation-period return
is attributable to a large number of small positive returns instead of a few jumps. As the high
formation-period return accumulated gradually over many days, the flow of information is contin-
uous.2 However, if the high formation-period return accumulated over a few days due to jumps,
then the flow of information is discrete. Empirical evidence confirms that discrete information is
associated with jumps in daily returns. Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of continuous versus
discrete information.
We investigate whether information discreteness influences return continuation using double-
sorted portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regressions. Consistent with our frog-in-the-pan hypothesis,
continuous information induces stronger and more persistent return continuation than discrete in-
formation. Over a six-month holding period, price momentum increases from 2.91% in the discrete
information portfolio to 8.86% in the continuous information portfolio. Furthermore, the momen-
tum profit following continuous information persists for eight months while the momentum profit
following discrete information is insignificant after two months. Moreover, the return predictability
associated with continuous information does not reverse. This lack of long-term return reversal is
consistent with investors underreacting to continuous information.
1Although daily stocks returns measure information with error because of market frictions and behavioral biases,
this error is small relative to the amount of information underlying extreme formation-period returns.
2Frequent fluctuations in the aggregate stock market index are a source of continuous information that is relevant
to individual stocks.
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The return consistency dummy variable of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) differs from informa-
tion discreteness in several important dimensions.3 Information discreteness is a continuous variable
ranging from minus one to plus one that is defined using daily returns while return consistency is a
dummy variable based on the sign of monthly returns. In contrast to our frog-in-the-pan hypothe-
sis, one motivation for Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)’s investigation of return consistency is the
disposition effect.4 Tax loss selling in January is also investigated since return consistency cannot
explain the continued poor performance of past losers. Indeed, return consistency only explains the
return continuation of past winners since return reversals in January offset the return continuation
of past winners with consistent returns. In contrast, following continuous information, we find
no evidence of return reversals or weaker return continuation in January. Moreover, within the
subsample of stocks with consistent returns (return consistency dummy variable equals one), port-
folio double-sorts confirm that continuous information results in stronger momentum than discrete
information. Overall, after controlling for return consistency, information discreteness continues to
predict cross-sectional differences in momentum.
A large literature identifies firm characteristics that are related to the strength of momentum
profitability. These characteristics include turnover (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000), size and analyst
coverage (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), book-to-market ratios (Daniel and Titman, 1999), return
consistency (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 2004), institutional ownership (Hou and Moskowitz, 2005),
as well as idiosyncratic volatility (Zhang, 2006). To account for their correlation with information
discreteness, we compute residual information discreteness by regressing information discreteness
on these firm characteristics. Over a six-month holding period, price momentum increases from
3.19% to 8.57% as residual information discreteness in the formation period varies from discrete to
continuous. Consequently, the return predictability of continuous information is distinct from firm
characteristics in the existing momentum literature and is not attributable to the return consis-
tency dummy variable in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (2004). Moreover, Fama-MacBeth regressions
confirm that this predictability is not caused by a delayed reaction to information. Unlike Hou and
Moskowitz (2005)’s price delay measure, information discreteness describes the flow of informa-
3Watkins (2003) defines a similar dummy variable to identify stocks whose prior monthly returns have the same
sign as their cumulative formation-period returns.
4An alternative motivation for Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)’s investigation of return consistency is its impact
on return volatility. The relative importance of idiosyncratic volatility versus information discreteness to return
continuation is thoroughly addressed in our study.
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tion. Indeed, while their price delay measure is a persistent firm characteristic that cannot explain
momentum, the lack of autocorrelation in the information discreteness of individual firms is com-
patible with the need to frequently rebalance momentum portfolios. Barberis and Huang (2008)
demonstrate that cumulative prospect theory allows the positive skewness of initial public offerings
and distressed firms to result in negative excess returns. Besides controlling for return skewness in
our Fama-MacBeth regressions, the removal of initial public offerings and distressed firms from our
sample does not alter our results.5 Consequently, skewness is not responsible for the return pre-
dictability of continuous information. Overall, after controlling for an array of firm characteristics
including return consistency and skewness, Fama-MacBeth regressions indicate that information
discreteness explains the profitability of both price momentum and earnings momentum strategies.
Zhang (2006) reports that momentum is stronger in stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility
during the formation period. Zhang interprets this finding as evidence that limits to arbitrage are
responsible for return continuation. However, past winners and past losers have high idiosyncratic
volatility during the formation period. More importantly, after accounting for the influence of
formation-period returns on idiosyncratic volatility, we report that momentum is not stronger for
stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility. Consequently, limited attention rather than limits to
arbitrage appears to explain cross-sectional differences in momentum profits.
The frog-in-the-pan hypothesis can apply to analysts as well as investors. We find that analyst
forecast errors are larger following continuous information. This finding suggests that continuous
information fails to attract analyst attention. Furthermore, a modified information discreteness
measure defined by signed analyst forecast revisions also indicates that continuous information
induces stronger momentum than discrete information.
5Although the Barberis and Huang (2008) model does not condition on the magnitude of prior returns, stocks
with inconsistent returns may have positive skewness if their formation-period returns are high. In all our empirical
tests, a $5 price filter is imposed. This filter eliminates the potential for low priced lottery stocks to influence our
results.
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To better understand the economic origins of information discreteness, we investigate the role
of the financial media, management-issued press releases, and analyst coverage on information
discreteness. This analysis connects information discreteness with the expanding literature that
documents the media’s influence on asset prices. This literature includes contributions by Tetlock
(2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), Fang and Peress (2009), and Tetlock
(2010). Our findings indicate that higher media coverage, measured by the number of news articles
appearing on the Dow Jones newswire, is associated with more discrete information. This find-
ing is consistent with the financial media accumulating information before releasing their salient
conclusions as well as the media’s focus on major corporate events such as mergers and acquisi-
tions. Indeed, media coverage and press releases capture an array of newsworthy corporate events.
Moreover, consistent with the results in Peress (2009), greater media coverage appears to weaken
return continuation by mitigating limited attention. Indeed, our study refines the channel through
which media coverage produces discrete information and thereby weakens return continuation. In
contrast, after controlling for media coverage, greater analyst coverage is associated with more
continuous information. Consequently, lower analyst coverage does not imply stronger momentum
provided a firm attracts sufficient media coverage.
The growing limited attention literature includes important contributions by Cohen and Frazz-
ini (2008) on supplier-customer linkages as well as Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2009) on the popularity
of information. This literature has recognized the need for information to attract investor atten-
tion with Barber and Odean (2008) reporting that small investors buy attention-grabbing stocks.
However, the prior literature has not distinguished between continuous and discrete information,
which is the central contribution of our paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our measure
of information discreteness. Section 3 then presents our results on the importance of information
discreteness to momentum. The economic origin of information discreteness is examined in Section
4. Section 5 then concludes and offers suggestions for future research.
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2 Data and Definitions
Return data is obtained from CRSP after adjusting for delistings. Shares splits are also accounted
for using the split factor in CRSP. Firm-level accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT.
Negative book values are eliminated from our sample period, which begins in 1976 and ends in
2007.6 A total of 2,301,912 firm-month observations are available in our sample.
Information discreteness is determined by the sign of daily returns and ignores their magnitude
by equally-weighting each observed return. The percentage of days during the formation period with
positive and negative returns are denoted %pos and %neg, respectively. Information discreteness,
which is abbreviated ID, is defined as
ID = sgn(PRET) · [%neg −%pos] , (1)
where the cumulative return during the formation period (past twelve months after skipping the
most recent month) is denoted PRET and its sign is denoted sgn(PRET), which is +1 when PRET
> 0, -1 when PRET < 0, and 0 when PRET = 0. Specifically, PRET is defined as a firm’s
cumulative return over the past twelve months after skipping the most recent month. A large
ID measure signifies discrete information while a small ID measure signifies continuous informa-
tion.7 For emphasis, information discreteness is interpreted after conditioning on the magnitude of
formation-period returns. Intuitively, ID captures the “distribution” of daily signed returns, which
ranges from a uniform distribution (continuous information) to a point mass (discrete information).
Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of information discreteness. Observe that ID is robust to
outliers whether PRET is near zero or large in absolute value.
For a winner stock with a high PRET, a time series of daily returns with a high percentage of
positive returns (%pos > %neg) contains a large number of small positive returns and few jumps.8
According to equation (1), the high percentage of positive returns yields a low value for ID. Indeed,
if a series of daily returns are all positive, then ID equals its minimum value of -1 and corresponds
to continuous information. In contrast, if the series of daily returns only contains one positive
6Our main results are nearly identical over a longer sample period starting in 1927. However, several firm charac-
teristics are unavailable in the earlier subperiod.
7Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) estimate a similar measure to capture cross-sectional commonality in the returns
within individual countries. In contrast, ID is estimated from a time series of returns for individual firms.
8With negative jumps, the percentage of positive daily returns must be even larger for a stock to be a past winner.
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return, then ID approaches +1 and corresponds to discrete information. Conversely, for a loser
stock whose PRET is low, a time series of daily returns with a high percentage of negative returns
(%neg > %pos) contains a large number of small negative returns and few jumps. Consistent
with information arriving continuously, this scenario also corresponds to a low value for ID. The
noise in daily returns implies that ID measures the flow of information with error. Nonetheless,
this measurement error is small relative to the extreme formation-period returns of winners and
losers. Indeed, PRET provides a general measure of both the aggregate quantity and quality of
information released during the formation period.
While ID does not differentiate between small and large daily returns, their magnitudes deter-
mine PRET. Indeed, by design, information discreteness is independent of the magnitude of daily
returns since these magnitudes determine formation-period returns as well as return volatility.
PRET also reflects a disproportionate number of either positive jumps or negative jumps within
the formation period. However, despite increasing return volatility, jumps of the opposite sign are
not relevant to our study of momentum provided PRET is near zero. The relationship between ID
and jumps is examined using the following jump5 variable
jump5 = [5 largest positive and 5 largest negative daily returns] · sgn(PRET) , (2)
and the following jump10 variable
jump10 = [10 largest positive and 10 largest negative daily returns] · sgn(PRET) . (3)
The inclusion of sgn(PRET) enables the jump variables to be larger if negative jumps in the
formation period are larger in absolute value than positive jumps. Thus, large values of jump5 and
jump10 capture return skewness. However, jump5 and jump10 are near zero if the positive and
negative jumps cancel each other since these variables are not intended to capture kurtosis.
To examine whether information discreteness is a firm characteristic, we estimate the price delay
measure in Hou and Moskowitz (2005) that identifies neglected firms. These firms are identified by
regressing firm-level weekly stock returns on contemporaneous market returns and lagged market
returns over the prior four weeks. This time series regression is estimated for individual firms
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using weekly returns over the prior year, with its R-squared denoted R2L. The R-squared from a
regression of firm-level weekly stock returns on contemporaneous market returns without lagged
market returns is denoted R2C . The price delay measure is then defined as
D = 1− R
2
C
R2L
. (4)
Intuitively, if prices rapidly incorporate market-level information, then lagged market returns are
unimportant and R2C is near R
2
L, with the D metric being closer to zero as a consequence. However,
if prices slowly incorporate market-level information, then R2C is far below R
2
L and the D metric is
closer to one. Thus, firms whose prices experience slower price reactions to market-level information
have larger D metrics.
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) report that the D metric is a firm characteristic related to analyst
coverage and institutional ownership that explains several return anomalies but not momentum.
In contrast, information discreteness is not a persistent firm characteristic. Instead, information
discreteness describes the flow of information to investors and varies over time for individual firms.
Specifically, in December of every year, we compute ID over the prior calendar year for each firm
in our sample. For the 2,500 firms with at least twenty annual ID measures, we regress each
firm’s ID measure on its prior calendar year’s ID to compute first order autocorrelation coefficients.
In unreported results, the cross-sectional average of these firm-level autocorrelation coefficients is
0.019. Therefore, unlike size, analyst coverage, or institutional ownership, information discreteness
is not persistent but varies over time for individual firms.
The momentum literature identifies several firm characteristics that are related to the strength
of momentum. Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009) and Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) inter-
pret low turnover as evidence of investor inattention while Lee and Swaminathan (2000) interpret
high turnover as a sign of investor sentiment in their study of price momentum.9 Furthermore,
Zhang (2006) uses idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for limits to arbitrage and reports stronger
momentum profits in stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility. We estimate idiosyncratic volatil-
ity (IVOL) using the residuals from a four-factor model involving daily returns, as in Fu (2009),
9Order flow imbalances over short horizons are not appropriate for measuring the flow of information. Liquid-
ity shocks can induce large order flow imbalances but exert a small influence on returns. Conversely, important
information can exert a large influence on returns but induce a small order flow imbalance if investors agree on its
implications.
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during the formation period. Zhang (2006) also finds that momentum is stronger in small firms
and firms with less analyst coverage. Furthermore, Daniel and Titman (1999) document a negative
relationship between the value premium and momentum. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) find that
investor recognition characteristics such as institutional ownership and analyst coverage explain
price delays while Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) report that stocks with lower analyst coverage have
stronger momentum.
To ensure that our findings regarding information discreteness are distinct from the existing
momentum literature, we compute residual information discreteness.10 Residual information dis-
creteness is computed from a cross-sectional regression of ID on the absolute value of PRET along
with firm characteristics that the existing literature has identified as being associated with cross-
sectional differences in momentum profits
IDi,t = δ0,t + δ1,t |PRET|i,t + δ2,tTURNi,t + δ3,t SIZEi,t + δ4,tBMi,t + δ5,tCOVERi,t
+δ6,t IVOLi,t + δ7,t IOi,t + δ8,tRCi,t + IDi,t . (5)
Residual ID is defined as IDi,t for firm i in month t. Besides the absolute value of PRET, which cap-
tures the extreme formation-period returns underlying momentum, the other firm characteristics
that define residual information discreteness include turnover (TURN), size (SIZE), book-to-market
ratios (BM), analyst coverage (COVER), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), institutional ownership
(IO), and a dummy variable for return consistency (RC). Analyst coverage is defined as one plus
the log number of analysts issuing forecasts for a particular firm. Quarterly data on institutional
ownership is obtained from the portfolio holdings reported in 13f filings with the SEC. These hold-
ings are then normalized by the total number of shares outstanding to compute the percentage of
shares held by institutions. Institutional ownership is then computed as one plus the log percentage
of shares owned by institutions. The return consistency dummy variable equals one if a stock’s
monthly returns are positive (negative) for at least eight months of the twelve-month formation
period and PRET is also positive (negative), as defined in Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004).
Besides residual information discreteness, we compute residual IVOL, which is orthogonal to
10Unlike the slow diffusion of information in Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), which pertains to the speed at which
information is transmitted across investors, the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis pertains to the distribution of information
across time. Indeed, small amounts of information can arrive continuously and be diffused rapidly across investors.
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the absolute value of formation-period returns. This property is important since past winners and
past losers have the highest absolute values of PRET. Residual IVOL is computed by the following
cross-sectional regression
IVOLi,t = γ0,t + γ1,t |PRET|i,t + IV OLi,t . (6)
The IV OLi,t residual for firm i defines its residual idiosyncratic volatility in month t.
Table 1 summarizes the variables in our study and reports on their correlations. The summary
statistics in Panel A indicate that ID has a mean near zero. According to Panel B, information
discreteness is not highly correlated with idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, while idiosyncratic
volatility has a positive correlation with the absolute value of formation-period returns, informa-
tion discreteness has a negative correlation. In unreported results, the time series average of the
cross-sectional correlations between IVOL and |PRET| for past losers and past winners is more
than double the correlation reported in Panel B. Thus, idiosyncratic volatility has a much higher
correlation with the absolute value of formation-period returns for stocks selected by momentum
strategies. The influence of extreme prior returns on idiosyncratic volatility is explored more thor-
oughly in the next section.
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that daily returns are positively skewed, while jump5 and jump10
are also positive on average. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 1 confirms that jumps are associated
with discrete information. In particular, ID is positively correlated with skewness, kurtosis, jump5,
and jump10. Information discreteness is also positively correlated with the price delay measure of
Hou in Moskowitz (2005) in equation (4). Thus, continuous information does not correspond to the
slow incorporation of information into stock prices. Moreover, the negative correlation between the
return consistency dummy variable and ID indicates that continuous information coincides with
a greater likelihood that monthly returns have the same sign as PRET. Therefore, our portfolio
double-sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions in the next section control for return consistency.
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3 Information Discreteness and Momentum
To examine the importance of information discreteness to momentum, we form double-sorted port-
folios sequentially that first condition on formation-period returns, then information discreteness.
Specifically, after sorting stocks into quintiles according to their PRET, we then subdivide these
quintiles into ID subportfolios. After imposing a $5 price filter, post-formation returns over the next
six-months and three-years are then computed. These holding period returns are risk-adjusted ac-
cording to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) that includes market, book-to-market,
and size factors.
Panel A of Table 2 reports that momentum, the six-month return from buying winners and
selling losers, decreases monotonically from 8.86% in the low ID quintile containing stocks with
continuous information to 2.91% in the high ID quintile containing stocks with discrete information.
This 5.95% difference is highly significant with a t-statistic of 5.13. Risk-adjusting the momentum
returns increases the disparity between the six-month holding period returns to 6.89% (t-statistic
of 7.01). In unreported results, the risk-adjusted returns are similar after including the liquidity
factor of Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003).
Figure 2 plots the momentum profits for the continuous and discrete information portfolios
from one to ten months after portfolio formation. These momentum profits are not cumulative
but represent “marginal” momentum profits within a particular month after portfolio formation.
This figure indicates that significant momentum profits following continuous information persist for
eight months. In particular, the momentum profit of 50bp (t-statistic of 2.27) in the eighth month
after portfolio formation decreases to 21bp (t-statistic of 0.98) by the next month. In contrast, for
stocks in the discrete information portfolio, the momentum profit of 32bp is insignificant by the
third month after portfolio formation (t-statistic of 1.34). Therefore, momentum is stronger and
more persistent following continuous information than discrete information.
The average ID, PRET, size, book-to-market ratio, analyst forecast dispersion, and IVOL cor-
responding to past winners and past losers in each of the ID quintiles are reported in Panel B. As in
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), size is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s mar-
ket capitalization at the end of each quarter. These averages indicate that stocks with continuous
information have similar characteristics as stocks with discrete information. Indeed, the variation
12
in momentum profits identified by information discreteness does not appear to be associated with
the size premium, value premium, or cross-sectional differences in earnings uncertainty. For exam-
ple, continuous information is not limited to small stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, nor is
continuous information (low ID) concentrated in past losers. The firm characteristics in Panel B
are studied in more detail below using Fama-MacBeth regressions.
Moreover, in unreported results, we confirm that the momentum profits in Table 2 are nearly
identical if NASDAQ-listed firms are removed from the sample. Furthermore, the Fama-MacBeth
coefficients in the next subsection involving information discreteness are also similar. Therefore,
empirical support for the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis is not driven by stocks listed on NASDAQ.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the momentum profits from independent double-sorts derived from
conditioning on PRET and information discreteness. The results in Panel C are similar to those
in Panel A for sequential double-sorts, with momentum increasing from 1.63% to 8.33% over the
six-month holding period as information during the formation period becomes more continuous.
Thus, the impact of information discreteness on return continuation is not sensitive to whether the
double-sorted portfolios are formed sequentially or independently.
According to Panel D, continuous information results in stronger momentum than discrete
information within the subsample of stocks with consistent returns (return consistency dummy
variable equals one). The subsample of stocks for which the return consistency dummy variable
equals one comprises 17.24% of the firm-month observations in our original dataset. The results in
Panel D indicate that the marginal return predictability of continuous information is significant after
controlling for return consistency. Indeed, within the subsample of stocks with consistent returns,
momentum increases monotonically across the information discreteness quintiles. The difference of
6.32% over the six-month holding period is significant (t-statistic of 5.18). Therefore, compared to
the return consistency dummy variable, information discreteness is superior at identifying cross-
sectional differences in momentum.
Moreover, Panel E reports that momentum is also monotonically increasing across the residual
information discreteness portfolios. As detailed in equation (5), residual information discreteness
accounts for return consistency as well as the absolute value of formation-period returns, turnover,
size, book-to-market ratios, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic volatility, and institutional ownership.
For the sequential double-sorts involving residual ID, momentum increases from 3.19% to 8.57%
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across the residual information discreteness quintiles. This 5.38% difference is highly significant
(t-statistic of 3.83) and confirms that information discreteness explains cross-sectional differences
in momentum after controlling for existing variables in the momentum literature.
Overall, the momentum profits in Table 2 suggest that investors underreact to continuous
information in a manner that is consistent with our frog-in-the-pan hypothesis. To clarify, the lack
of short-term return continuation following discrete information does not contradict the concept of
an upper threshold for investor attention. The maximum amount of information that investors can
process in one day is determined by the aggregate amount of information regarding all firms released
each day, as in Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009)’s study. In contrast, our empirical tests focus on
time series variation in the daily returns underlying twelve-month formation-period returns.11
An underreaction to information does not predict post-formation return reversals over the long
term. Nagel (2001) argues that long-term return reversals are attributable to changing book-to-
market characteristics. George and Hwang (2004) as well as Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) also
cast doubt on the link between short-term return continuation and long-term return reversals.
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) attribute long-term reversals to tax-loss selling rather than in-
vestor overreaction. Tax loss selling in January provides one explanation for the inability of return
consistency to explain the continued poor performance of past losers since the ability of return
consistency to explain return continuation is limited to past winners in their study. The three-year
holding-period returns in Table 2 are inconsistent with long-term return reversals for stocks in the
low ID quintile with continuous information, despite their significant short-term return continua-
tion. Indeed, stocks with continuous information in the formation period have higher long-term
risk-adjusted returns than stocks with discrete information in the formation period. Moreover, in
unreported results, we find no evidence of return reversals or weaker return continuation in January
following continuous information.
Table 2 provides limited evidence that investors overreact to discrete information since discrete
information during the formation period leads to negative (albeit insignificant) risk-adjusted returns
in the three years after portfolio formation. Moreover, Figure 2 indicates that momentum profits
following discrete information are negative within seven months of portfolio formation. Finally, a
11Industry and macroeconomic information as well as information regarding a firm and its peers are manifested in
these daily returns.
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6-1-6 momentum strategy whose formation period and holding period are both six months produces
similar momentum profits as the 12-1-6 momentum strategy whose profits are reported in Table
2. In unreported results, profits from the 6-1-6 momentum strategy are monotonic across the
information discreteness portfolios, providing a highly significant 10.34% unadjusted holding-period
return in the low ID quintile.
3.1 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
We also estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions to determine whether continuous information is re-
sponsible for momentum after controlling for firm characteristics that the prior literature has shown
to predict returns. The dependent variable in these regressions are individual stock returns over a
six-month horizon. To examine price momentum, our cross-sectional regressions include formation-
period returns (PRET). Similarly, to examine earnings momentum, standardized unexpected earn-
ings (SUE) from the prior quarter are included in our regression analysis. An SUE is computed
by comparing a firm’s realized earnings in the most recent quarter with its realized earnings in the
same quarter of the prior year, with this difference then normalized by the standard deviation of
its earnings over the prior eight quarters.
Size and book-to-market ratios are also included in the cross-sectional regression since these
characteristics are the basis for the Fama-French factors. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001)
also document that turnover predicts returns and attribute this finding to the ability of high vol-
ume to overcome investor inattention. Therefore, we control for turnover in our Fama-MacBeth
regressions. IVOL is also included in our cross-sectional regressions to ensure that the return pre-
dictability attributable to information discreteness is not a manifestation of idiosyncratic volatility’s
return predictability (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006). In addition, Sadka (2006) reports
that liquidity has a systematic component. Therefore, we include Amihud’s measure (AMIHUD)
in our cross-sectional regressions to control for illiquidity. For completeness, we include skewness
(SKEW) and kurtosis (KURT) to account for the possibility that information discreteness is cap-
turing these statistical properties of daily returns. The price delay metric (DELAY) of Hou and
Moskowitz (2005) defined in equation (4) is also included to control for the speed at which investors
incorporate information into stock prices.
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) identify several firm characteristics that predict re-
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turns. These characteristics include earnings-to-price ratios, total accruals to total assets, capital
expenditures to total assets (CAPEX), previous sales growth, long-term analyst forecasts, and
prior forecast revisions. Appendix A of Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) defines each of
these characteristics in detail. Total assets is defined using a firm’s current assets.12 CAPEX sums
a firm’s capital expenditures over the prior four quarters, on a rolling basis. Both total assets
and CAPEX are quarterly variables normalized by a firm’s total assets. Sales growth is a ratio
whose numerator equals quarterly sales over the prior four quarters and whose denominator equals
quarterly sales over a non-overlapping horizon consisting of the prior eight to four quarters. Prior
forecast revisions are computed as annual consensus forecasts over the past six months normalized
by price. These characteristics form a vector X of control variables whose individual coefficients
are not reported for brevity.
Observe that several of the independent variables in equation (7) below are also independent
variables in the computation of residual ID in equation (5). This commonality arises from the prior
literature’s use of firm characteristics such as size to predict returns and to explain cross-sectional
differences in momentum profits.
We estimate several Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression specifications to evaluate the impact of
information discreteness on return continuation. The first specification examines the influence of
information discreteness on price momentum
ri,t+h = β0 + β1 PRETi,t + β2 IDi,t + β3 (ID · PRET)i,t + β4 SUEi,t
+β5 SIZEi,t + β6 BMi,t + β7TURNi,t + β8 IVOLi,t + β9AMIHUDi,t
+β10 SKEWi,t + β11KURTi,t + β12DELAYi,t + αXi,t + i,t+h . (7)
A separate specification replaces information discreteness with its residual counterpart in equation
(5). The price momentum literature implies a positive β1 coefficient. The β2 coefficient captures
the return predictability of information discreteness with a negative coefficient indicating that
discrete information leads to poor future returns. More importantly, a negative β3 coefficient for
the interaction between formation-period returns and information discreteness, ID·PRET, indicates
12Depreciation along with changes in cash, current liabilities, current long-term debt, and deferred taxes are then
subtracted from current assets.
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that continuous information results in stronger price momentum than discrete information. This
interaction variable controls for the magnitude of formation-period returns when investigating the
influence of information discreteness on price momentum. In particular, discrete information (high
ID) corresponds with less return continuation if β3 is negative.
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 demonstrate the influence of information discreteness and resid-
ual information discreteness, respectively, on price momentum. In both panels, the β1 coefficients
for PRET are positive, which is consistent with price momentum, while the β2 coefficients for in-
formation discreteness are insignificant. Although the ID variable itself does not exert a significant
impact on momentum, the negative β3 coefficients indicate that price momentum is stronger when
information during the formation period is continuous. Recall that ID is an interaction variable
whose interpretation is conditional on formation-period returns. In particular, discrete information
(high ID) corresponds to weaker price momentum while continuous information (low ID) corre-
sponds to stronger price momentum. This finding supports our frog-in-the-pan hypothesis. In
addition, the negative β3 coefficient involving residual ID in Panel B demonstrates that the return
predictability of continuous information is not driven by its correlation with firm characteristics in
the existing momentum literature.
In addition, the positive β4 coefficients for SUE are consistent with the earnings momentum
(post-earnings announcement drift) literature. Furthermore, the negative β5 coefficients for size and
positive β6 coefficients for book-to-market are consistent with the higher returns of small stocks and
value stocks relative to large stocks and growth stocks, respectively. The negative β7 coefficient for
turnover indicates that higher turnover in the formation period leads to lower subsequent returns.
Amihud’s liquidity measure, kurtosis, and the price delay measure have insignificant coefficients
while the coefficient for skewness is negative. Using cumulative prospect theory, Barberis and
Huang (2008) demonstrate that the positive skewness of initial public offerings and distressed
firms can result in negative excess returns. Besides controlling for return skewness in our Fama-
MacBeth regressions, unreported results demonstrate that removing initial public offerings (IPOs)
and distressed firms from our sample does not alter our holding-period returns. IPOs are defined
as firms whose initial appearance in CRSP occurs twelve months before portfolio formation, while
firms are distressed if their KMV default scores are in the top decile.13 The imposition of a
13A description of these default scores is available on http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/index.html.
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$5 price filter also eliminates the potential for low priced lottery stocks to influence our results.
Consequently, while discrete information coincides with positive skewness (according to Panel B of
Table 1), skewness is not responsible for the return predictability of continuous information.14
Information discreteness also explains price momentum after controlling for the return pre-
dictability of idiosyncratic volatility. For emphasis, IVOL is computed during the formation period
along with PRET and ID. Therefore, it is not directly comparable to the idiosyncratic volatility
in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) based on returns in the most recent month, which is
omitted from the formation period. Bali, Scherbina, and Tang (2010) find short-term return re-
versal follows increases in idiosyncratic volatility, and link these increases with firm-level news.
In contrast, the momentum profits following continuous information do not reverse. The lack of
long-term return reversal provides further evidence that information discreteness is unrelated to
idiosyncratic volatility.
In unreported results, computing IVOL using daily returns in the month prior to portfolio for-
mation does not alter the return predictability of information discreteness. We focus our exposition
on IVOL computed using weekly returns during the formation period for the sake of comparison
with Zhang (2006). A detailed comparison of our results with Zhang is conducted in the next
subsection. Furthermore, replacing the ID measure in equation (7) with |SKEW| does not result in
a significant β3 coefficient. Therefore, although skewness is correlated with discrete information ac-
cording to Table 1, information discreteness is not captured by conventional moments of the return
distribution. Finally, the addition of interaction variables involving PRET, such as TURN · PRET,
and interaction variables involving ID, such as SIZE · ID, as well as triple interaction variables in-
volving both PRET and ID, such as SIZE · PRET · ID, does not diminish the significance of the β3
coefficients reported in Table 3. Therefore, it is unlikely that the ability of continuous information
to identify cross-sectional variability in momentum profits is attributable to an omitted variable.15
To analyze the impact of information discreteness on earnings momentum, the following Fama-
14The negative coefficient for skewness indicates that stocks with positive skewness may have lower expected returns
but function as a “lottery” by having a low probability of a high return. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2010) report
that extremely large positive returns in the prior month, which are not included in formation-period returns, are
associated with negative subsequent returns.
15The anchoring bias, which posits that investors are reluctant to update their strong prior beliefs, is also consistent
with the return predictability of continuous information. For example, investors may require discrete information to
overcome their strong prior beliefs. The inclusion of proxies for uncertainty such as IVOL as well as their interactions
with ID and PRET control for the possibility that continuous information induces stronger return predictability when
uncertainty is lower.
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MacBeth regression is estimated
ri,t+h = β0 + β1 SUEi,t + β2 IDi,t + β3 (ID · SUE)i,t + β4 PRETi,t
+β5 SIZEi,t + β6 BMi,t + β7TURNi,t + β8 IVOLi,t + β9AMIHUDi,t
+β10 SKEWi,t + β11KURTi,t + β12DELAYi,t + αXi,t + i,t+h . (8)
In this specification, the β1 coefficient corresponds to the most recent SUE instead of formation-
period returns, while the β2 coefficients applies to information discreteness. Furthermore, the
interaction variables underlying the β3 coefficients involve the most recent earnings surprise, ID ·
SUE, instead of formation-period returns.
Panel C and Panel D of Table 3 demonstrate the influence of information discreteness and resid-
ual information discreteness, respectively, on earnings momentum. In both panels, the positive β1
coefficients are consistent with earnings momentum. As with price momentum, the β2 coefficients
for information discreteness are insignificant. Instead, the negative β3 coefficients indicate that
earnings momentum is stronger for stocks with continuous information during the formation pe-
riod. Thus, continuous information explains earnings momentum as well as price momentum. The
positive β4 coefficients for PRET account for price momentum while the remaining beta coefficients
have similar interpretations as their counterparts in Panel A and Panel B. Overall, Table 2 and
Table 3 provide strong empirical support for the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis.
3.2 Information Discreteness and Volatility
To address the possibility that information discreteness is higher (more discrete) when idiosyncratic
volatility is higher, this subsection re-visits Zhang (2006)’s finding that momentum is stronger in
stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility. Besides the disposition effect, Grinblatt and Moskowitz
(2004)’s study is also motivated by the possibility that return consistency impacts return volatility.
The prior belief that continuous information corresponds to low idiosyncratic volatility suggests a
contradiction between our finding that stronger momentum corresponds to continuous information
and Zhang’s finding that stronger momentum corresponds to high idiosyncratic volatility. Brav,
Heaton, and Li (2009) conclude that as a proxy for limits to arbitrage, idiosyncratic volatility cannot
explain the returns from past winners. Moreover, we emphasize that the relationship between
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idiosyncratic volatility and momentum reported in Zhang may be driven by a mechanical feature
as the extreme returns that define winners and losers induce high idiosyncratic volatility.
We begin by sequentially forming double-sorted portfolios that first condition on IVOL, then
PRET. Zhang (2006) also conditions on idiosyncratic volatility before conditioning on formation-
period returns within the volatility portfolios. Post-formation holding period returns for the double-
sorted portfolios over the subsequent six-months are then reported in Panel A of Table 4 along with
long-term returns over the subsequent three years. Both unadjusted and risk-adjusted returns from
the three-factor model are reported.
Consistent with Zhang (2006), Panel A of Table 4 presents evidence of stronger momentum in
high IVOL stocks. From the low IVOL to high IVOL quintiles, momentum increases from 3.31% to
8.90% over a six-month horizon, a difference of 5.59%. However, as alluded to earlier, this finding
may result from a mechanical relationship between high IVOL and extreme prior returns. To shed
light on this issue, we reverse the order of the sequential double-sort by conditioning on PRET
before IVOL.
The reverse double-sort examines the marginal return predictability of IVOL after controlling
for formation-period returns. The results from this sequential double-sort in Panel B of Table 4
indicate a much weaker relationship between IVOL and momentum. Indeed, the 2.68% increase in
momentum profits from the low IVOL quintile to the high IVOL quintile is much smaller than the
5.59% difference reported in Panel A. Consequently, the marginal return predictability of idiosyn-
cratic volatility is weaker after controlling for the influence of formation-period returns.
Moreover, Panel C of Table 4 presents the returns from the same sequential double-sort under-
lying Panel B but with residual IVOL defined in equation (6) replacing IVOL. Residual IVOL is
orthogonal to the absolute value of formation-period returns by construction. The results in Panel
C provide evidence against the limits to arbitrage interpretation of high idiosyncratic volatility.
Specifically, stocks with high residual IVOL produce a six-month momentum return of 6.87% while
those low residual IVOL produce a momentum return of 6.62%. This difference of 0.25% is insignif-
icant, which indicates that momentum is not stronger in stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility
after accounting for the influence of formation-period returns.
To summarize, Table 4 demonstrates that after controlling for the influence of formation-period
returns on idiosyncratic volatility, higher idiosyncratic volatility is not associated with stronger
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momentum.
3.3 Analyst Forecasts and Information Discreteness
Besides investors, analysts may also underreact to continuous information. Indeed, continuous
information can lead to larger earnings surprises defined relative to the consensus forecast of analysts
if analysts are subject to the frog-in-the-pan phenomena. We obtain annual earnings per share
forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) Summary unadjusted file between
1985 and 2007. Unadjusted IBES forecasts are not adjusted by share splits after their issuance
date.16
Using individual firm-level analyst forecasts, we construct consensus earnings per share forecasts
for each firm. On any day an analyst forecast is observed, we calculate the consensus as the mean of
all forecasts issued within the prior 30 days. If an analyst issues more than one forecast within the
prior 30 days, we include their most current forecast in the consensus forecast calculation. Forecasts
issued more than 365 days before the earnings report date are excluded, along with forecasts
corresponding to realized earnings per share that exceed the share price. Following Livnat and
Mendenhall (2006), analyst-based earnings surprises denoted SURP are defined as the difference
between a firm’s actual earnings per share and its IBES reported analyst consensus forecast. This
difference is then normalized by the firm’s share price on its earnings announcement date.
To test whether continuous information yields larger analyst forecast errors, we regress the
absolute value of analyst forecast errors on information discreteness. Other variables that can
affect the accuracy of consensus forecasts are included in this analysis. Analyst forecast dispersion
captures the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s earnings, and is computed as one plus the log standard
deviation of analyst forecasts. Analysts may expend more effort on their earnings forecasts for stocks
with high past returns and high turnover as well as growth stocks and large stocks if information on
their future earnings is in greater demand by investors, including institutional investors (O’Brien
and Bhushan, 1990), and can generate larger trading commissions. Therefore, we control for
PRET, analyst forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, book-to-market ratios, size, turnover, and
institutional ownership characteristics when examining the relationship between analyst forecast
16As detailed in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), the earnings per share after a share split is often a small
number that I/B/E/S rounds to the nearest cent. This rounding procedure can distort certain properties of dollar-
denominated analyst forecasts such as their revisions and forecast errors.
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errors and information discreteness.
To test the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis using analyst forecast errors, we estimate the following
regression
|SURP|i,t = β0 + β1 IDi,t + β2 PRETi,t + β3DISPi,t + β4COVERi,t + β5 BMi,t
+β6 SIZEi,t + β7TURNi,t + β8 IOi,t + i,t . (9)
A negative β1 coefficient provides support for the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis. In particular, the
negative β1 coefficient implies that continuous information leads to larger analyst forecast errors.
Panel A of Table 5 contains the coefficient estimates from equation (9). Consistent with our
frog-in-the-pan hypothesis, the β1 coefficient is negative with a t-statistic of -4.66. This finding
suggests that analysts are slower to incorporate continuous information into their forecasts than
discrete information.
The negative β2 coefficient indicates that earnings surprises are smaller for firms with higher
formation-period returns. In addition, forecast uncertainty lowers analyst forecast errors as the
β3 coefficient is also negative. Analysts may exert additional effort on their forecasts when they
deviate from the forecasts issued by their peers. The negative β4 coefficient is consistent with
greater analyst coverage reducing forecast errors. Consequently, more analysts lead to a more
accurate consensus forecast even when their individual forecasts are disperse. Analysts also issue
more accurate forecasts for large value firms with more institutional investors than small growth
firms with less institutional investors. High turnover, which may be interpreted as disagreement
between investors (not analysts), leads to larger forecast errors.
In addition, information discreteness in equation (1) can be constructed from analyst forecast
revisions instead of returns where %up and %down are defined by upward and downward revisions,
respectively, for the current fiscal year’s forecasted earnings. The modification of ID using forecast
revisions is denoted IDf and equals
IDf = sgn(CUMREV) · [%downward−%upward] . (10)
The cumulative revision during the formation period is denoted CUMREV whose sign is +1 when
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CUMREV > 0 (upward revision), -1 when CUMREV < 0 (downward revision), and 0 when CUM-
REV = 0. For every firm-fiscal year, we define CUMREV as the difference between the last consen-
sus forecast before an annual earnings announcement and the first forecast. As with our original
information discreteness measure in equation (1), IDf in equation (10) is lower when information
arrives continuously.
After estimating IDf , we re-estimate equation (9) with ID defined by returns replaced with IDf
defined by analyst forecasts. The results in Panel B of Table 5 are similar to those reported in
Panel A. Most importantly, the β1 coefficient continues to be negative. The majority of the other
coefficients have the same sign as their counterparts in Panel A although the significance of the
coefficients for analyst forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership declines.
We also repeat the cross-sectional regressions in equation (7) and equation (8) with IDf replacing
ID in the independent variables corresponding to the β2 and β3 coefficients. For price momentum,
the Fama-MacBeth regression specification is
ri,t+h = β0 + β1 PRETi,t + β2 IDf i,t + β3 (IDf · PRET)i,t + β4 SUEi,t
+β5 SIZEi,t + β6 BMi,t + β7TURNi,t + β8 IVOLi,t + β9AMIHUDi,t
+β10 SKEWi,t + β11KURTi,t + β12DELAYi,t + αXi,t + i,t+h , (11)
and for earnings momentum the Fama-MacBeth regression specification is
ri,t+h = β0 + β1 SUEi,t + β2 IDf i,t + β3 (IDf · SUE)i,t + β4 PRETi,t
+β5 SIZEi,t + β6 BMi,t + β7TURNi,t + β8 IVOLi,t + β9AMIHUDi,t
+β10 SKEWi,t + β11KURTi,t + β12DELAYi,t + αXi,t + i,t+h . (12)
The results from these regressions are reported in Panel C and Panel D of Table 5, respectively.
The β3 coefficients for the interaction variables involving IDf along with either PRET or SUE are
both negative. Consequently, continuous information defined by analyst forecast revisions results
in greater price momentum and earnings momentum than discrete information. Overall, Table 5
provides additional empirical support for the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis.
The coefficients for size and book-to-market characteristics have similar signs as their counter-
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parts in Table 3. Although the beta coefficients for turnover and Amihud’s measure are insignificant,
the coefficients for skewness and kurtosis are negative and significant. Indeed, large positive jumps
in the formation period precede poor returns over the next six-month horizon. Furthermore, as in
Table 3, the beta coefficient for the price delay measure is insignificant.
4 Origin of Information Discreteness
Our next analysis explores the economics determinants of information discreteness. For example,
we examine whether information arrives in large discrete amounts because the supply of information
from management and the financial press is discrete.
Management press releases and coverage by the financial press are important internal and
external sources of information, respectively. However, not all press releases receive media coverage.
We examine press releases that do not receive media coverage within seven days (PR) and articles
in the financial press (MEDIA) that do not occur within seven days of a press release to mitigate
their confounding effects. The PR and MEDIA variables refer to the number of press releases and
news articles in the prior year for an individual firm, respectively.
Corporate press releases are typically issued via newswire services. After firms distribute their
press releases to newswire companies, press releases are disseminated to news distribution channels
that include local newspapers, national newspapers, TV networks, and financial news services
such as Bloomberg, Dow Jones/Factiva, and Thomson Reuters. News distribution channels may
distribute these press releases depending on the newsworthiness of the press release and their news
processing capacity. Our press release dataset contains all corporate press releases disseminated
by PR Newswire from over 4,700 public companies which are traded on NASDAQ, NYSE, and
AMEX from January 2000 to December 2007. Firms typically engage one newswire company
at a given point in time. Neuhierl, Scherbina, and Schlusche (2010) report that nearly 60% of
all publicly traded firms use PR Newswire. However, as our sample is not comprehensive, we
restrict our analysis to firms that have at least one recorded press release in PR Newswire. In
unreported results, firms using PR Newswire versus other alternatives do not differ in terms of firm
characteristics such as firm size, growth, and industry affiliations. We match press releases to firm
identifiers (CRSP permno) using the source identifier provided by PR Newswire, which includes
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the website URL of the issuing company as well as its name and address. We match these source
identifiers to the company information in COMPUSTAT. To further improve the match quality,
we use the soundex algorithm in SAS to match the firm names reported in the press releases with
the firms names in COMPUSTAT. Our final sample contains over 220,000 press releases for 4,702
firms.
Our media data is obtained from Factiva, which contains media reports from several sources
including newswires as well as local and national newspapers. From these sources, we focus on the
most comprehensive financial news service, Dow Jones Newswire. Dow Jones Newswire obtains data
from several sources including press releases, firm disclosures, and reports produced by financial
journalists. As our sample begins in 2000, it does not suffer from the backfill bias reported in
Tetlock (2010). To match news stories with financial databases, we use the ticker symbols, firm
names, and name variants from the CRSP database as the search strings in Factiva using procedures
outlined in Gurun and Butler (2010). Specifically, using a web crawler, we search name variants by
singular and plural versions of the following abbreviations from the company names: ADR, CO,
CORP, HLDG, INC, IND, LTD, and MFG. Our final sample includes over 420,000 firm-day media
reports for 5,330 firms between 2000 and 2007.
Analysts represent another external information intermediary between firms and investors.
Therefore, we include analyst coverage in our following analysis.17 The prior literature (Bushee and
Noe, 2000) reports that higher institutional ownership coincides with better disclosure by firms.
Institutional investors often demand greater access to information while information may also be
in greater demand for large firms that have more shareholders. Thus, our next analysis controls for
institutional ownership as a proxy for corporate disclosure along with firm size. In addition, firm
fixed effects are included in our analysis, which account for differences in information discreteness
across industries.
To examine the determinants of information discreteness, we estimate the following Fama-
17Information intermediaries such as analysts and financial journalists can alter the discreteness of information by
releasing salient information gradually or aggregating small amounts of information.
25
MacBeth regression
IDi,t = β0 + β1 PRi,t + β2MEDIAi,t + β3COVERi,t + β4 SIZEi,t
+β5 IOi,t + β6 |PRET|i,t + i,t . (13)
This regression is conducted separately for stocks with high and low formation-period returns since
ID is an interaction variable whose interpretation requires us to condition on the magnitude of
formation-period returns. In particular, equation (13) is estimated for stocks whose formation-
period returns are above and below the cross-sectional median, while |PRET| is also included as
an additional control variable.
The correlations between the independent variables in equation (13) are reported in Panel A
of Table 6. PR and MEDIA are negatively correlated, both are positively correlated with analyst
coverage and size. Thus, large firms have more analyst coverage, attract more media coverage, and
issue more press releases than small firms. Panel B of Table 6 reports on the beta estimates for
past winners. These coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The negative β1
coefficient for PR indicates that management press releases (without media coverage) yield contin-
uous information. The positive β2 coefficient in Panel A implies that media coverage (unrelated
to management press releases) produces discrete information. Intuitively, news articles appear-
ing in the financial press are required to be sufficiently salient in order to be published. Indeed,
media outlets follow a large number of firms, while management is only responsible for releasing
information for their firm. Furthermore, major corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions
that coincide with the discrete release of information are likely to attract media attention. Greater
analyst coverage results in more continuous information since β3 is negative. For past winners,
larger firms and those with higher institutional ownership also have more continuous information
as the β4 and β5 coefficients are both negative.
Panel C of Table 6 reports on the beta estimates from equation (13) for past losers. Once again,
these coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. In contrast to past winners, the β1
coefficient for PR is insignificant. The β2 coefficient for media remains positive but is less significant,
implying that news articles on past losers have a marginal impact on information discreteness.
Although press releases exert an insignificant impact on information discreteness for past losers,
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analyst coverage continues to lower information discreteness as the β3 coefficient remains negative.
Interestingly, the β4 coefficient for size is positive for past losers. Thus, large firms that have
done poorly in the formation period have more discrete information. In conjunction with discrete
information resulting in weaker momentum, the more discrete information associated with large
firms indicates that return continuation is stronger for small stocks that are past losers (Hong, Lim,
and Stein, 2000).
In summary, articles in the financial press are associated with discrete information. Therefore,
consistent with the results in Peress (2009), greater media coverage appears to weaken return
continuation. Our study refines the channel through which greater media coverage produces more
discrete information and consequently weaker return continuation. For past winners, management
press releases produce continuous information although greater analyst coverage is associated with
more continuous information for all firms. More importantly, lower analyst coverage does not
necessarily imply stronger return continuation provided a firm attracts media coverage. Indeed,
after controlling for media coverage, greater analyst coverage leads to more continuous information
and stronger momentum.
5 Conclusions
We test a frog-in-the-pan hypothesis that predicts investors underreact to small amounts of infor-
mation that arrive continuously. After controlling for the cumulative amount of information within
the formation period, we find strong evidence that small amounts of information that arrive contin-
uously predict returns and explain cross-sectional differences in momentum. Thus, consistent with
our frog-in-the-pan hypothesis, investors appear to underreact to small amounts of information
that arrive continuously, despite their important cumulative implications for stock prices.
Information discreteness is first defined using signed daily returns to distinguish between small
amounts of information that arrive continuously versus information that arrives in large amounts at
discrete points in time. Information discreteness identifies time series variation in the daily returns
that comprise the formation-period returns underlying momentum strategies. The interpretation of
information discreteness is conditional on a formation-period return. Indeed, only after conditioning
on formation-period returns can one distinguish between the return implications of continuous
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versus discrete information.
Information discreteness is not influenced by extreme returns and differs from idiosyncratic
volatility. Moreover, after accounting for the impact of extreme formation-period returns, higher
idiosyncratic volatility is not associated with stronger momentum. Thus, information discreteness
exerts a greater impact on momentum than idiosyncratic volatility. This finding suggests that
limited attention is more important to explaining momentum than limits to arbitrage.
Analyst forecast errors are also larger following continuous information. Thus, analysts ap-
pear to underreact to continuous information. Furthermore, we define an alternative measure of
information discreteness using signed analyst forecast revisions instead of signed daily returns.
This alternative measure of information discreteness confirms that momentum is stronger following
continuous information.
Greater media coverage by the financial press is associated with more discrete information,
and weaker momentum as a consequence. In contrast, a larger number of management press
releases is associated with more continuous information, but only for past winners. After controlling
for media coverage and management press releases, greater analyst coverage corresponds to more
continuous information for all firms. Overall, lower analyst coverage does not imply stronger return
continuation provided a firm attracts sufficient media coverage.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A of this table reports summary statistics for information discreteness (ID) defined as sgn(PRET) · [%neg −%pos] in
equation (1) where %pos and %neg denote the respective percentage of positive and negative daily returns during the formation
period. Summary statistics are also reported for formation-period returns (PRET), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), two jump
variables, skewness, kurtosis, the price delay measure (DELAY) of Hou and Moskowitz (2005), and the return consistency
dummy variable (RC) defined in Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004). Summary statistics include the mean and standard deviation
(Std. Dev.) along with the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Information discreteness captures the distribution of daily
returns across the formation period. Continuous information arrives frequently in small amounts while discrete information
arrives infrequently in large amounts. PRET corresponds to a firm’s formation-period return in the prior twelve months after
skipping the most recent month, while IVOL is estimated according to Fu (2009) within the same period. The jump5 variable
is defined in equation (2) using the sum of the five largest daily positive returns and the sum of the five largest daily negative
returns. Similarly, jump10 is defined in equation (3) using the largest ten daily returns. The price delay measure is defined in
equation (4) while the return consistency dummy variable equals one if a stock’s monthly returns are positive (negative) for
at least eight months of the twelve-month formation period and PRET is also positive (negative). Residual IVOL is computed
in equation (6) as the residual from the following cross-sectional regression, IVOLi,t = γ0,t + γ1,t |PRET|i,t + IV OLi,t .
Residual ID is computed in equation (5) as the IDi,t residual from the following cross-sectional regression,
IDi,t = δ0,t+δ1,t |PRET|i,t+δ2,t TURNi,t+δ3,t SIZEi,t+δ4,t BMi,t+δ5,t COVERi,t+δ6,t IVOLi,t+δ7,t IOi,t+δ8,t RCi,t+IDi,t ,
using firm characteristics that include turnover (TURN), size (SIZE), book-to-market ratios (BM), analyst coverage (COVER),
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), institutional ownership (IO), and the dummy variable for return consistency. Panel B contains
the correlations between the variables in Panel A.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Percentiles
Mean 25th 50th 75th Std. Dev.
ID -0.034 -0.065 -0.031 0.000 0.053
residual ID 0.000 -0.031 0.002 0.031 0.051
PRET 0.177 -0.189 0.078 0.367 0.904
|PRET| 0.430 0.125 0.279 0.528 0.815
IVOL 0.517 0.053 0.139 0.385 4.321
residual IVOL 0.000 -0.432 -0.189 -0.037 4.304
skewness 0.212 -0.166 0.186 0.611 1.392
kurtosis 7.337 1.468 3.109 7.184 14.021
jump5 0.058 -0.022 0.036 0.120 0.189
jump10 0.087 -0.019 0.059 0.172 0.238
DELAY 0.562 0.293 0.568 0.849 0.303
RC 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.384
Panel B: Correlations
residual residual
ID ID PRET |PRET| IVOL IVOL skewness kurtosis jump5 jump10 DELAY RC
ID 1
residual ID 0.156 1
PRET 0.068 0.020 1
|PRET| -0.101 -0.002 0.710 1
IVOL -0.012 -0.002 -0.084 0.102 1
residual IVOL -0.003 -0.002 -0.149 0.000 0.992 1
skewness 0.088 0.013 0.248 0.110 -0.007 -0.017 1
kurtosis 0.023 0.002 -0.022 0.051 0.016 0.010 0.010 1
jump5 0.229 0.040 0.209 0.209 0.017 0.007 -0.034 0.266 1
jump10 0.260 0.047 0.260 0.253 0.020 0.008 0.000 0.231 0.962 1
DELAY 0.051 0.005 -0.014 0.027 0.053 0.043 0.086 0.098 0.059 0.069 1
RC -0.301 -0.000 0.092 0.167 0.017 0.007 0.013 -0.034 -0.018 -0.001 -0.002 1
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Table 4: Momentum and Idiosyncratic Volatility
This table reports on the relationship between momentum and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). Idiosyncratic volatility
is estimated as in Fu (2009) by computing risk-adjusted weekly returns according to the three-factor model over the prior
year. IVOL equals the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from this regression. We sequentially sort stocks into
IVOL quintiles, then formation-period return quintiles (PRET) within each of the IVOL quintiles. PRET corresponds to a
firm’s formation-period return in the prior twelve months after skipping the most recent month. Both unadjusted returns and
risk-adjusted returns relative to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) are reported. Post-formation momentum
returns over a six-month holding period for each of the five IVOL quintiles are presented in Panel A. The momentum profits
in Panel B arise from the opposite sequential double-sort which first conditions on PRET, then IVOL to test the marginal
influence of IVOL on momentum after controlling for cumulative formation-period returns. The double-sorts in Panel C parallel
those in Panel B with IVOL replaced with residual IVOL, which is defined as the residual from the following cross-sectional
regression IVOLi,t = γ0,t + γ1,t |PRET|i,t + IV OLi,t to control for the influence of formation-period returns on idiosyncratic
volatility. The t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with six lags and reported in italics.
Panel A: Double-sorts involving idiosyncratic volatility, then formation-period returns
unadjusted three-factor
IVOL Winner Loser Average six-month six-month
1 2 3 4 5 IVOL return t-stat alpha t-stat
high 8.50 7.31 6.16 3.83 -0.40 0.85 8.90 5.74 11.28 8.49
2 11.60 9.58 8.46 6.78 4.07 0.28 7.53 5.45 9.78 8.92
3 11.73 10.03 8.93 7.66 5.99 0.13 5.74 5.67 7.52 9.18
4 10.80 9.24 8.37 7.84 6.36 0.06 4.44 5.67 5.59 8.51
low 10.06 8.41 7.48 7.14 6.75 0.02 3.31 5.76 3.88 6.50
high-low 0.83 5.59 3.95 7.39 5.68
Panel B: Double-sorts involving formation-period returns, then idiosyncratic volatility
unadjusted three-factor
IVOL Winner Loser Average six-month six-month
1 2 3 4 5 IVOL return t-stat alpha t-stat
high 7.11 8.29 8.07 6.54 0.09 0.75 7.02 4.14 8.87 6.80
2 10.90 9.66 8.92 7.38 3.48 0.29 7.42 5.30 9.93 8.62
3 11.35 9.80 8.38 7.66 4.93 0.14 6.42 4.73 8.92 8.32
4 10.95 9.24 8.07 7.45 5.94 0.08 5.01 4.13 7.08 6.90
low 10.33 8.72 7.78 7.07 5.99 0.03 4.34 4.26 6.13 7.28
high-low 0.72 2.68 2.07 2.75 2.44
Panel C: Double-sorts involving formation-period returns, then residual idiosyncratic volatility
unadjusted three-factor
residual IVOL Winner Loser Average six-month six-month
1 2 3 4 5 residual IVOL return t-stat alpha t-stat
high 7.31 8.3 8.01 6.5 0.44 0.31 6.87 4.17 9.60 6.42
2 9.62 9.42 8.74 7.47 3.86 -0.19 5.76 5.77 7.97 7.33
3 10.83 9.6 8.39 7.56 5.08 -0.33 5.75 4.64 8.25 8.09
4 10.68 9.19 7.98 7.46 5.58 -0.40 5.10 4.61 7.05 7.51
low 12.37 9.22 8.06 7.11 5.75 -0.49 6.62 4.78 8.36 8.37
high-low 0.80 0.25 0.37 1.24 1.04
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Continuous versus Discrete Information
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Figure 1 This figure provides a visual illustration of the difference between continuous information
versus discrete information over a ten-period horizon. Information discreteness (ID) is defined in
equation (1) to capture the distribution of daily returns across the formation period. Continuous
information arrives frequently in small amounts while discrete information arrives infrequently in
large amounts. Observe that the cumulative amount of information during this horizon is identical,
at 10%, where the magnitude of information is represented by its cumulative return implications.
According to its definition in equation (1), the continuous information has an ID measure of -1 (its
minimum) while the discrete information has an ID measure of 0.8 (approaching its maximum).
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Three-factor alpha
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Figure 2 This figure plots risk-adjusted momentum profits in the continuous and discrete infor-
mation portfolios from one to ten months after portfolio formation. Information discreteness is
defined in equation (1) to capture the distribution of daily returns across the formation period.
Continuous information arrives frequently in small amounts while discrete information arrives infre-
quently in large amounts. Momentum profits in month t+x, where x ranges from 1 to 10, based on
double-sorted portfolios formed in month t according to formation-period returns and information
discreteness. These momentum profits are not cumulative. Instead, they are time series averages
of holding-period returns in a single month after portfolio formation, with the month of portfolio
formation varying across the sample period.
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